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1 Introduction
Shares in initial public offerings (IPOs) are typically sold at a fixed price, which is set after marketing
the issue to investors and recording their demand.1 Despite the prior interaction with investors, the
offer price typically generates a sizeable first-day return—the standard measure of underpricing.
Over the period 1980-2014, the first-day return in U.S. IPOs averaged 18%, leaving substantial
profits for investors participating in the offering.2
There is a number of alternative explanations for the underpricing in IPOs, ranging from asym-
metric information to investor sentiment and conflicts of interests within integrated investment
banks.3 Benveniste and Spindt (1989) provide an information-based explanation for the underpric-
ing. In their model, investors receive underpriced shares in return for truthfully revealing their
demand during the book building preceding the offering, allowing the underwriter to set a price
that maximizes the issuer’s proceeds. Their argument receives strong empirical support beginning
with Hanley (1993). She shows that the initial return is increasing in the revision of the offer price
from the mid-point of the pricing range indicated in the prospectus, as if investors’ information is
not fully priced—an empirical regularity known as the “partial adjustment” phenomenon.
While it may be rational to compensate investors for private information that helps increase the
precision of the offer price, there is substantial evidence that public information also affects IPO
underpricing. As shown by Loughran and Ritter (2002) and Lowry and Schwert (2004), the higher
the market return leading up to the offering, the greater is the underpricing.4 This predictability
of initial returns is puzzling since the public information is freely available to the underwriter
and should be fully incorporated into the offer price. The extant literature has attacked this
puzzle by assuming irrational behavior (Loughran and Ritter, 2002; Derrien, 2005) or an exogenous
correlation between the state of the economy and the expected value of the issuer’s shares to the
investor (Edelen and Kadlec, 2005; Sherman, 2005; Leite, 2007).
Our contribution is twofold. First, we endogenously derive the correlation between the public
signal and the IPO underpricing in a model that preserves the information-based intuition of the
1The auction method, most spectacularly used by Google in 2004, is an exception (Derrien and Womack, 2003;
Lowry, Officer, and Schwert, 2010).
2Source: Jay Ritter at http://bear.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/ipodata.htm
3See, e.g., Ljungqvist (2007) for a comprehensive survey of the empirical IPO underpricing literature.
4See also Logue (1973), Bradley and Jordan (2002), Benveniste, Ljungqvist, Wilhelm, and Yu (2003), Ince (2014)
and Kutsuna, Smith, and Smith (2009).
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Benveniste and Spindt (1989) framework. The key assumption is that the public and private signals
are informative about the issuing firm’s value, which in a rational Bayesian equilibrium generates
a conditional correlation between the signals. Second, we perform large-sample tests of the model
and find strong empirical support for its predictions.
In our model, the public information affects the equilibrium underpricing through two channels:
investor demand for allocations and investor incentives to truthfully reveal their private information.
We refer to the first channel as the demand effect of the public signal. Intuitively, since the public
and private signals are conditionally correlated, the public information affects the distribution
of investors’ private signals and thus their demand for share allocations. Specifically, a positive
(negative) public signal is associated with a higher (lower) likelihood of sufficient investor demand
to generate underpricing.
The second channel through which the public signal affects underpricing is what we label the
incentive effect: the conditional initial return necessary to induce investors to truthfully reveal their
private signal. This channel is new to the literature and unique to our model. As in Benveniste and
Spindt (1989), investors may misrepresent their information in an attempt to lower the offer price.
However, the underwriter optimally allocates shares to investors reporting positive information
and strategic false reporting may cut the investor’s allocation. The likelihood that an untruthful
investor receives shares in the issue depends on the public signal: it is lower (higher) for a positive
(negative) signal, reducing (increasing) the incentives to report falsely. The public signal also affects
the expected aftermarket value of the firm, where a positive (negative) signal reduces (increases)
the marginal informational value of the private signal. Thus, to induce investors to truthfully reveal
their signals, the underwriter must, ceteris paribus, underprice the issue less (more) when the public
signal is positive (negative).
Through the demand effect and the incentive effect, the public signal has both a positive and a
negative effect on the expected underpricing. The ultimate impact of the public signal depends on
the relative magnitude of the two channels. In our setting, the informational value of each private
signal is declining in the number of investors participating in the offering. Thus, when the number
of investors is sufficiently large, the demand effect dominates the incentive effect and the expected
underpricing is positively related to the public information, consistent with extant evidence.
We test our model in a sample of 6,300 U.S. IPOs in the period 1983 to 2012. To correct for
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any potential truncation of the initial returns caused by withdrawn offerings, we follow Edelen and
Kadlec (2005) and use a two-step Heckman (1979) procedure. A unique and central implication of
the model is that investors require higher conditional initial returns to truthfully report their private
information in falling markets than in rising markets. We test this by regressing the initial IPO
return on an interaction term between the private information and a dummy variable indicating
that the return on the S&P500 index leading up to the issue is positive. To capture investor private
information, we use the revision in the final offer price from the initial pricing range mid-point,
orthogonalized to the S&P500 index to purge any effect of the market return on the offer price
revision.
Cross-sectional regressions produce a negative and highly significant coefficient for the key
interaction term. That is, the initial return associated with an offer price revision is lower when
the market return is positive than when it is negative, as predicted by the model. This finding is
new to the empirical literature and consistent with the incentive effect. The result are robust to
the inclusion of standard control variables and the correction for self-selection, which in itself lacks
statistical significance.
Like Benveniste and Spindt (1989), our model holds that investor bids are informative. Following
Wang and Yung (2011), who show that the partial adjustment phenomenon is concentrated to top-
tier underwriters, we split the sample according to underwriter rank. Importantly, the interaction
term for the incentive effect is highly significant only in the subsample of top-tier underwriters,
where the order book is held to be most informative.5 Moreover, after controlling for the incentive
effect, the correlation between the first-day return and the pre-issue market return disappears,
hence resolving the puzzling predictability of initial returns.
For completeness, we also show that the implications of the demand effect hold in the data. As
expected, the likelihood that the initial return is positive increases with the stock market return
during the book building. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the model.
The relation between public information and the expected underpricing is discussed in Section 3.
In Section 4, we describe the sample and report the results from our empirical tests. Section 5
concludes. All proofs are found in Appendix A.
5See, e.g., Ljungqvist (2007) and Jenkinson and Jones (2004).
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2 The model
We start with a firm that is about to offer its shares to outside investors through an IPO. The true
value of the firm is high G with probability α and low B with probability 1− α, where G > B. To
simplify the exposition, and with no loss of insight, we let G = 1 and B = 0. We also normalize
the number of shares to be floated to one and let investors be allocated fractions of this share. All
agents are risk neutral and the risk-free interest rate is zero.
There are N ≥ 2 investors participating in the offering. Each investor i = 1, . . . , N observes at
a zero cost a private signal si = {gi, bi}, where gi represents positive and bi negative information
about the firm. We may think of these investors as the underwriter’s regular pool of investors
and the signal si as their unique knowledge about the firm as well as information about their
own demand and liquidity.6 Let n ∈ [0, N ] denote the number of investors who observe positive
private signals. The precision in the private signal si is the same across all investors and equals
γ = q(gi|G) = q(bi|B), where q(·|·) and q(·) denote conditional and unconditional probabilities
throughout. We let γ > 1/2 to make the signal informative about the true value of the firm, so
that q(G|gi) > q(G) > q(G|bi).
Moreover, all investors observe a common public signal s = {g, b}, where g represents positive
and b negative information. The precision in the public signal is given by µ = q(g|G) = q(b|B),
where µ > 1/2 and so it is informative. We can think of the public signal as market-wide informa-
tion, such as changes in aggregate demand or the business cycle, which affects the value of the firm.
In the empirical analysis below, we use the stock market return during the book-building process
as a proxy for the public signal.
We further assume that the signals, or more precisely the error terms, are uncorrelated condi-
tional on the true value of the firm, so that q(gi, g|G) = q(gi|G)q(g|G) and q(gi, g|B) = q(gi|B)q(g|B).7
By Bayes’ rule, these assumptions yield the following result:
6Alternatively, one could assume that investors’ private signals are costly and that the underwriter is able to
distinguish informed from uninformed investors, and will allow only informed investors to participate in the book-
building process. If now the underwriter is unable to commit to compensate investors for their informational costs,
then the number N of investors in the offering will be determined endogenously from their incentive constraint and
the pricing of the issue will be the same as under our zero-cost assumption.
7Using the normal distribution as a reference point, our informational assumptions are akin to having the true
value of the firm V be normally distributed with some mean V¯ and variance σ2V and letting each investor i observe
a signal si = V + i, where i has a zero mean, cov(i, j) = 0 for i 6= j, and cov(si, sj) = σ2V > 0. Similarly, for a
public signal s = V + p, it will be the case that cov(i, p) = 0, and cov(si, s) = σ
2
V .
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Lemma 1 The probability that an investor’s private signal si is positive (negative) is higher if the
public signal s is positive (negative) than if it is negative (positive); in other words, q(gi|g) > q(gi|b)
and q(bi|b) > q(bi|g).
Lemma 1 implies that the distribution of investors’ private signals will depend on the realization
of the public signal. The positive conditional correlation follows directly from the assumption that
the signals are informative about the true value of the firm.8
Let v(n, s) denote the market value of the firm after it is publicly listed. The aftermarket value
is assumed to fully reflect all available information at the time of the offering. That is, v(n, s) is
the expected value of the firm conditional on the n positive private signals observed by investors
and the public signal s, and hence ∂v/∂n > 0. Because the aftermarket value of the firm increases
with the number of positive private signals, n is also a measure of the demand for shares in the
issue, and where a higher n corresponds to higher demand. We refer to the case where n = N and
all investors observe positive private signals as the high-demand state. The other extreme case,
where n = 0 and all investors observe negative private signals, is labelled the low-demand state.
With v(n, s) as a conditional expectation, the marginal impact of each investor’s private signal
on the firm’s aftermarket value is decreasing in the number N of investors in the offering. This way
of modeling the impact of the private signals is consistent with standard micro-structure models,
where investors’ private information is reflected in the stock price through the trading process.9
However, it contrasts with the Benveniste and Spindt (1989) setup, where the firm’s aftermarket
value is additive in investors’ private signals so that each private signal “has an equal (absolute)
marginal impact on the stock’s value” (p. 347) irrespective of N .
The book-building process is run by an underwriter, whose services are free of charge. The
underwriter declares a pricing and allocation rule that maximizes the proceeds to the issuer. After
observing the public and private signals, investors report their signal by placing a “high” or “low”
bid. In equilibrium, all investors truthfully report their signals. Thus, when the underwriter sets
the offer price at the end of the book-building process, he correctly anticipates the firm’s value
v(n, s) in the aftermarket.
8That is, q(gi|G) > 1/2, q(g|G) > 1/2, q(bi|B) > 1/2, and q(b|B) > 1/2.
9See, e.g., Kyle (1985). In Chen and Wilhelm (2008) a similar effect in the IPO aftermarket leads early stage
investors to bid aggressively since they expect their information to become less important as additional informed
investors enter the market.
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Let p(n, s) denote the offer price if n investors report a positive private signal and given the
public signal s. Moreover, let z(gi, n) and z(bi, n) denote the fraction of the issue allocated to an
investor who submits a high and a low bid, respectively. Since all private signals have the same
precision, investors with identical bids receive equal allocations.
We follow Benveniste and Spindt (1989) and assume that the issuer is committed to price the
firm at or below its aftermarket value, so that p(n, s) ≤ v(n, s). Unlike them, however, we place
no restrictions on the number of shares that can be allocated to one investor.10 As shown in
Proposition 1 below, it is optimal to allocate the whole issue to investors submitting high bids as
long as there is at least one high bid. As a consequence, an investor placing a low bid will receive
an allocation if and only if the remaining N − 1 investors also bid low.11
Let us next consider investors’ incentives to truthfully reveal their private signals. Trivially, an
investor with negative information has little upside from reporting falsely. By placing a high bid,
she risks being awarded shares at a price exceeding the aftermarket value implied by her private
signal. Thus, she is better off truthfully bidding low and possibly—if all bids are low—receive
shares at a price correctly reflecting her signal.
Instead, we need to worry about the incentives of investors with positive private signals. These
investors may benefit from falsely reporting a negative signal in order to lower the issue price. The
potential cost of such a strategy is, however, that at least one other investor may place a high bid,
leaving the untruthful investor without any shares in the issuing firm.
For an investor i with a positive private signal, the expected payoff from bidding high is
U(s) =
N∑
n=1
q(n|s)z(gi, n)[v(n, s)− p(n, s)], (1)
where q(n|s) is the probability that n investors receive positive private signals conditional on the
public signal s and v(n, s)−p(n, s) is the underpricing of the offering. With an allocation of z(gi, n),
the expected payoff to investor i is her fraction of the underpricing, probability-weighted across
different n.
10In Appendix B, we derive a more general model with allocation restrictions, which generates the same predictions.
11As Benveniste and Spindt (1989), we assume that the IPO is completed in the low-demand state. We do, however,
adjust for the effect of withdrawn issues in the empirical analysis below.
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The expected payoff to the same investor from falsely placing a low bid is
Uˆ(s) =
N∑
n=1
q(n|s)z(bi, n)[v(n, s)− p(n− 1, s)]. (2)
For a given n and s, the offer price is now lower, p(n − 1, s) < p(n, s), as is the probability of
receiving an allocation in the IPO, z(bi, n) < z(gi, n). By falsely placing a low bid, the investor
earns a higher initial return conditional on an allocation, but at the same time risks ending up
without any shares in the issuing firm.
The payoff Uˆ(s) is the minimum rent for an investor with a positive private signal and hence
represents this investor’s reservation value. To induce the investor to truthfully report her signal, the
expected payoff U(s) from bidding high must equal or exceed the expected profits Uˆ(s) from falsely
bidding low. The issue must thus be priced and allocated to satisfy the truth-telling (incentive)
constraint U(s) ≥ Uˆ(s).
The expected proceeds EΠ from the IPO are given by
EΠ =
N∑
n=0
q(n|s)p(n, s). (3)
Formally, the objective of the underwriter is to maximize EΠ with respect to allocations z(si, n)
and prices p(n, s) subject to the incentive constraint U(s) ≥ Uˆ(s) and the pricing constraint
p(n, s) ≤ v(n, s). Since issuance costs are exclusively determined by investors’ informational rents
Uˆ , maximizing EΠ is equivalent to minimizing Uˆ . The underwriter will further price and allocate
the issue such that investors’ truth-telling constraint is satisfied as an equality, U(s) = Uˆ(s).
Proposition 1 The issuer maximizes expected proceeds EΠ by pricing the issue so that
p(N, s) = v(N, s)− q(1|s)
q(N |s) [v(1, s)− v(0, s)], (4)
and
p(n, s) = v(n, s) for n = 0, . . . , N − 1 (5)
7
while allocating it according to
z(bi) = 0 and z(gi) =
1
n
for n = 1, . . . , N (6)
and
z(bi, n) =
1
N
for n = 0. (7)
Proposition 1 shows that the issue is underpriced in the high-demand state, where all N in-
vestors obtain positive private signals and, in equilibrium, truthfully submit high bids. Since the
aftermarket value v(n, s) is increasing in n, it follows that v(1, s) > v(0, s) and p(N, s) < v(N, s), so
the issue is underpriced (Eq. (4)). In contrast, there is no underpricing when n < N and investor
demand is low (Eq. (5)). Moreover, the issue is optimally allocated by awarding 1/n shares to each
of the n investors placing high bids (Eq. (6)), with the exception of the low-demand state, where
all N investors bid low and each receive a fraction 1/N of the issue (Eq. (7)).
The underwriter underprices the issue in the high-demand state by partially adjusting the offer
price to the private information uncovered during the book building, hence leaving a profit for the
investors that are awarded shares. As the firm starts trading at its aftermarket price, the initial
return is given by
r(N, s) =
v(N, s)
p(N, s)
− 1. (8)
Since the probability of the high-demand state is q(N |s), the expected initial return is
Er(s) = q(N |s)r(N, s). (9)
The analysis so far has established that IPOs are expected to be underpriced in order to induce
investors to truthfully report their private information, similar to Benveniste and Spindt (1989).
In the next section, we go beyond this standard argument and examine the relation between the
public information and underpricing.
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3 Public information and underpricing
As shown in Eq. (9), the expected initial return Er(s) is the product of the conditional initial
return and the probability that the issue is underpriced. A key contribution of this paper is the
insight that the public signal affects the expected initial return through both r(N, s) and q(N |s),
as discussed next.
Proposition 2 (The incentive effect) The initial return in the high-demand state is negatively
related to the public signal s, so that r(N, g) < r(N, b).
Proposition 2 shows that the conditional initial return is negatively related to the public signal.
To understand this result, which we label the incentive effect, note that the public signal affects
investors’ incentives in three ways. First, because the private and public signals are conditionally
correlated, it follows that q(1|g) < q(1|b). That is, the probability that an investor receives under-
priced shares after falsely submitting a low bid is lower for a positive public signal, reducing the
expected payoff from false reporting.
Second, the marginal impact of a positive private signal on the firm’s aftermarket value is
negatively related to the public signal, ∂v(n, g)/∂n < ∂v(n, b)/∂n. The payoff to an investor
receiving underpriced IPO shares after reporting falsely is therefore lower for a positive public
signal, reducing the investor’s incentives to falsely place a low bid.
Third, the conditional correlation implies that q(N, g) > q(N, b) and the likelihood that an
investor receives underpriced shares after truthfully bidding high, q(N, s)/N , is higher for a positive
public signal. Thus, the expected payoff from truthful reporting is higher for a positive public signal,
and the underwriter can increase the IPO price without jeopardizing investors’ incentives to bid
high.
The incentive effect holds that the public signal has a negative impact on the expected initial
return through investors’ incentives to truthfully reveal their information. However, as shown in
Eq. (9), the expected initial return is also affected by the public signal through the probability
q(N |s) that there is sufficient demand for the issue to be underpriced.
Proposition 3 (The demand effect) The probability of the high-demand state, where the IPO
is underpriced, is positively related to the public signal, i.e., q(N |g) > q(N |b).
9
As stated in Proposition 3, the likelihood of the high-demand state, where the issue is under-
priced, is higher for a positive public signal. This channel, which we label the demand effect, follows
trivially from the conditional correlation between the private and public signals.
Through the two channels in our model, the public information have both a positive and a
negative impact on the expected underpricing. We next show that the demand effect will dominate
as long as a large number of investors participate in the IPO.
Proposition 4 When the number N of investors in the issue is sufficiently large, the demand
effect strictly dominates the incentive effect and the expected initial return is positively related to
the public signal.
The intuition of Proposition 4 relies on the declining impact of an investor’s private signal
on the firm’s aftermarket value as the number of investors in the issue increases. Specifically,
as N increases, the investor’s potential payoff from falsely bidding low, v(1, s) − v(0, s), drops.
This decline in informational rents reduces the amount of underpricing required to induce truthful
revelation. Thus, an increase in N decreases the relative importance of the incentive effect. Once
the number of investors in the issue is sufficiently large, the demand effect strictly dominates and
the public signal is positively related to the expected underpricing, consistent with extant evidence.
In sum, our model provides a rational explanation for the empirical observation that the initial
return in IPOs increases with the market return during the book-building process. We derive this
prediction in a Bayesian equilibrium from the assumption that the private and public signals are
informative about the underlying value of the issuing firm.
The model identifies two channels through which public information affects the expected IPO
underpricing. The first channel is through investors’ incentives to report truthfully, which influence
the conditional initial return (the incentive effect). The second channel is through the likelihood
that the issue is in high demand and the underwriter optimally underprices the issue (the demand
effect). When the number of investors in the issue is large, the demand effect dominates the
incentive effect and the expected initial return is positively related to the public signal.
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4 Empirical tests of the model
In our model, the public signal has both a positive and a negative effect on the expected underpric-
ing. Prior studies, which show that the initial return increases with the pre-issue market return,
document the combined effect of the two channels. In this paper, we design an empirical testing
strategy that allows us to examine each channel separately.
The incentive effect holds that the public signal affects the expected underpricing through
investors’ incentives to report truthfully. It the context of the literature, it implies that the un-
derpricing associated with a given offer price revision is greater in falling markets than in rising
markets. This empirical prediction is new to the literature and unique to our model. The demand
effect, on the other hand, channels the impact of the public signal through the probability that
the issue is underpriced. It implies that the likelihood of the underwriter underpricing the IPO
increases with the pre-issue market return.
In the cross-sectional analysis below, we first establish that the positive relation between the
initial return and the pre-issue market return found in other studies holds for our sample. We then
test each of the two channels in our model and show that the predictability of the initial return
to the market return disappears for top-tier underwriters once we control for the incentive effect.
Before presenting the cross-sectional analysis, however, we’ll first introduce the sample, provide a
brief univariate analysis, and analyze the probability of completing the IPO.
4.1 Sample selection, description and key variables
We start by selecting all 13,462 U.S. IPOs in the period 1970 to 2012 from the Global New Issues
database in Thompson Financial’s SDC. To identify book-built IPOs, we restrict the sample to the
8,825 cases with a spread between the high and low filing price. SDC does not report a filing range
prior to 1981, so this restriction effectively eliminates all offerings in the 1970s.
We require the IPO firms to have a filing midpoint of at least $5 per share, be matched with
CRSP and be listed on NYSE, AMEX or Nasdaq. All unit offerings, real estate investment trusts,
financial institutions, American Depository Receipts, and closed-end funds are eliminated. We
further restrict the sample to firms with a founding year in the Field-Ritter founding data set and
a lead underwriter rank in the Ritter underwriter ranking data set, and require the completed
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IPOs to trade by the 42nd trading day after the public listing.12 These selection criteria produce a
final sample of 6,301 IPOs filed between 1983 and 2012, of which 5,369 are completed and 932 are
withdrawn.
Table 1 reports the number of cases, initial returns and pre-issue market returns by year. The
initial return is defined as IR1 = p1/p0 − 1, where p1 is the firm’s closing price on the first day
of trading and p0 is the final offer price, winsorized at 200%. In the empirical analysis below, we
use IR1 as a proxy for the underpricing in the IPO.13 The market return (Public) is the return on
the S&P500 index over the 42 trading days preceding the IPO issue date. We select this window
to match the typical registration period in our sample. As shown in column (1), a majority of the
sample firms (58%) file to go public in the 1990s, while 25% file in the 2000s and 17% file in the
1980s.
The next four columns of Table 1 present statistics for the 5,369 completed IPOs. As reported
in column (3), the average initial return is 19.7%, with a peak of 67% and 53% in 1999 and 2000,
respectively. Moreover, the average market return preceding the issue is 2.5% (column (4)) and it
is positive for 72% of the IPOs (column (5)). Notice that even in the hot issue year of 1999, one-
quarter of the completed IPOs were preceded by negative market returns. The last four columns of
Table 1 present statistics for the 932 withdrawn IPOs. As shown in column (7), 15% of the IPOs in
our sample are withdrawn. Not surprisingly, the withdrawn IPOs are preceded by a lower market
return of on average 0.9% (column (8)). Yet, the pre-issue market return is positive for as many
as 60% of the withdrawn IPOs (column (9)).
A test of our model requires a measure for the private information uncovered by the underwriter
through the book-building process. We follow Hanley (1993) and rely on the revision in the final
offer price: Revision = p0/pmid − 1, where pmid is the midpoint of the initial filing range in the
prospectus. Some of the price revision may, however, follow from market-wide information reaching
the underwriter during the registration period. We therefore purge any effect of the stock market
return from the offer price revision. Specifically, Private is the residual  from the regression
Revision = α+ β ∗Public+ . Thus, we consider all information in the price revision beyond that
12The founding year and lead underwriter rank is from Jay Ritter’s web page at the University of Florida.
13In unreported regressions, where we use the first-month return as a proxy for the underpricing, the inferences are
qualitatively unchanged.
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attributable to the stock market to be private.14
Price revisions are, however, discrete and done in tick size increments. Thus, even if there is
no private information in the update and Revision is correctly adjusted for the market return, it
is unlikely that  equals exactly zero. With an average mid-range price in our sample of $14, a tick
size roughly corresponds to 1%.15 We therefore set Private to zero for 243 cases where || < 1% of
the mid-range price.
Wang and Yung (2011) find evidence of more frequent filing of price revisions by reputable
investment banks and conclude that the partial adjustment phenomenon is attributable to the
top-tier underwriters. As discussed in Ljungqvist (2007), this is consistent with the difference
in results found by Cornelli and Goldreich (2003) and Jenkinson and Jones (2004). The former
examine the order book of a top-tier underwriter and show that more informative bids—limit-order
bids, bids received early, and revised bids—receive greater allocations. Jenkinson and Jones (2004),
however, find no such evidence for the order book of a lower-tier underwriter and suggest that there
are important differences in the informativeness of the order book between top-tier and lower-tier
underwriters.
Since our framework requires informative investor bids, we follow Carter and Manaster (1990)
and split our sample into IPOs where the highest-ranked lead underwriter is a top-tier underwriter
(rank=9) versus a lower-tier underwriter (rank<9). Half of the completed IPOs in our sample are
sold by top-tier underwriters, while the other half use lower-tier underwriters. Given systematic
differences in the informativeness of the order book, the incentive effect should be strongest for the
subsample of IPOs sold by top-tier underwriters.
The offer price revisions in our data are consistent with top-tier underwriters receiving informa-
tive bids and lower-tier underwriters failing to do so. First, the average price revision is positive for
top-tier underwriters and negative for lower-tier underwriters, suggesting that top-tier underwriters
receive more valuable information through the book building process. Second, when conditioning
on a positive price revision, the offer price adjustment is substantially larger for the top-tier under-
writers, consistent with a greater informational content. Third, the fraction of issues priced above
(below) the initial filing range is significantly higher for top-tier (lower-tier) underwriters, as if their
14Although the price revision has been shown to vary with certain offer characteristics, these are known when the
initial filing range is set and do not represent new information in our setting.
15Stocks trade on NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ in price increments of $1/8 or $1/16 for most of our sample period.
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book building generates more (less) valuable information.
4.2 Univariate analysis
We first examine the relation between the first-day return and the pre-issue market return in the
univariate. Table 2 shows the average initial return (IR1) for the 5,369 completed IPOs, split by
falling (PublicNEG) and rising (PublicPOS) stock markets, where the subscripts NEG and POS
indicate that the variable Public is ≤ 0 and > 0, respectively.
In our model, the underwriter underprices the offering only in the high-demand state, i.e.,
when a large number of investors receive a positive private signal. To capture investor demand,
the table further separates the issues into positive (PrivatePOS) and negative (PrivateNEG) offer
price revisions, adjusted for any influence of the market return as explained above. The first three
columns present the full sample of completed IPOs, while columns (4)-(6) and (7)-(9) show the
two subsamples of top-tier and lower-tier underwriters, respectively. Variable definitions and data
sources are listed in Table 3.
Panel A addresses the incentive effect. Starting with the full sample, the average initial return
is substantially higher when investor demand is high rather than low. For example, in column (1),
IR1 is 41% for PrivatePOS and only 4% for PrivateNEG, consistent with underwriters rewarding
investors for their private information. Moreover, comparing columns (1) and (3), the average
initial return is lower in falling markets than in rising markets (18% vs. 20%, with p<0.05 for the
difference). This positive correlation between initial returns and market returns is the predictability
puzzle that our model sets out to explain.
The incentive effect, however, implies a negative relation between the conditional initial return
and market return for issues in high demand. As shown in Panel A, the difference in mean initial
return has the opposite sign for PrivatePOS , where average IR1 is significantly higher in falling
than rising markets (41% vs. 35%, p<0.05), consistent with the incentive effect.
Panel B of Table 2 deals with the demand effect, which predicts that the likelihood that an
issue is underpriced increases with the market return. As reported in table, the fraction of IPOs
with positive initial return (IR1 > 0) is significantly lower in falling stock markets irrespective of
investor demand. For example, 76% of all IPOs are underpriced in falling markets vs. 81% in rising
markets, with p<0.001 for the difference, as implied by the demand effect.
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We next turn to the subsamples based on underwriter quality. As shown in Panel A, the initial
return is positively associated with underwriter rank. For example, when the market return is
positive, the first-day return averages 25% for IPOs sold by top-tier underwriters (column (6)) and
16% for lower-tier underwriters (column (9)).
Focusing on the top-tier underwriters (columns (4) to (6)), the difference in average initial
return across falling and rising markets is a significant -11% (p<0.01) for issues in high demand,
consistent with the incentive effect. Panel B further shows that the fraction of IPOs with positive
initial return is statistically undistinguishable across falling and rising market for these issues, as
if the demand effect is weak. Combined, these two observations suggest that the conditional initial
return—the incentive channel—drives the difference in average IR1 for high-demand issues sold
by top-tier underwriters. This is consistent with our conjecture that the incentive effect should be
stronger when the order book is relatively informative.
For lower-tier underwriters, however, our model predicts the incentive effect to be weak and the
demand effect to dominate. The evidence in columns (7) to (9) of Table 2 supports this conjecture.
First, for issues in high demand sold by lower-tier underwriters, the average initial return in Panel A
is significantly lower in falling markets (22% vs. 27% in rising markets, p<0.05), as if the incentive
effect is weak. Second, from Panel B, the probability that these IPOs have a positive initial return
is also significantly lower in falling than rising markets (88% vs. 93%, p<0.05), as implied by the
demand effect. Thus, for issues in high demand sold by lower-tier underwriters, it appears that the
likelihood that the issue is underpriced—the demand channel—drives the initial return difference
across market conditions.
Finally, Panel C of Table 2 shows the number of observations across the different subsamples
and illustrates the conditional correlation between the private and public signals in our model.
For the full sample, the fraction of IPOs with high demand (PrivatePOS) is significantly higher
in rising than falling markets (49% vs. 39%). Conversely, the fraction of IPOs with low demand
(PrivateNEG) is significantly lower in rising markets (51% vs. 61% for PublicNEG). This pattern,
which supports Lemma 1, holds across all underwriter types.
Overall, the univariate statistics in Table 2 are consistent with the empirical implications of
our model. First, while the average initial return and the market return are positively associated
in the sample at large, they are negatively related in the subsample where the incentive effect is
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expected to be strong (issues in high demand sold by top-tier underwriters). Second, the fraction
of IPOs with a positive initial return is lower when the stock market is falling, as implied by the
demand effect. Third, the likelihood that the final offer price is adjusted upwards—tantamount to
high investor demand—is higher when markets are rising, consistent with a conditional correlation
between the private and public signals.
4.3 Withdrawal of the IPO
To empirically test our model, we regress the initial return on the pre-issue market return in various
specifications capturing the implications of the incentive and demand effects. Note first that issuers
may choose to withdraw the IPO when the market return is low (Busaba, Benveniste, and Guo,
2001; Benveniste, Ljungqvist, Wilhelm, and Yu, 2003). The decision to withdraw the IPO leads
to a truncation of the sample of initial returns and the coefficients from an ordinary least squares
(OLS) regression may be biased. To correct for this truncation in the observed underpricing, we
follow Edelen and Kadlec (2005) and use a two-step Heckman (1979) procedure.
This subsection describes the first step of the Heckman prodedure, in which the probability of
completion (versus withdrawal) is estimated. Table 4 reports the coefficient estimates from probit
regressions, where column (1) uses the full sample of 6,301 IPOs and columns (2) and (3) present
the results for the two subsamples defined by underwriter rank.
The explanatory variables are issue and market characteristics that previously have been shown
to affect the withdrawal decision. The first two variables are the pre-issue stock-market return
in rising and falling markets: Public*PublicPOS and Public*PublicNEG, respectively. Moreover,
Underwriter Count is the number of underwriters in the offering, Amount Filed is log of the dollar
value of the issue, and Underwriter Rank is the Carter and Manaster (1990) rank of the top
underwriter.
The next three variables describe the current state of the IPO markets, measured across all IPOs
over the 42 trading days preceding the issue: Spillover Revision is the average offer price revision
(Revision) ortogonalized to Public; Spillover IR1 is the average initial return (IR1) ortogonalized
to Public and Spillover Revision; and Spillover Withdrawn is the number of withdrawn IPOs during
the same period.16 All variables are defined in Table 3.
16We use the residuals from the regressions Revision = α + β ∗ Public +  and IR1 = α + β1 ∗ Public + β2 ∗
16
Starting with column (1), the regression results are consistent with prior studies. The likelihood
that the offering is successful decreases with issue size and increases with the number and rank of
underwriters marketing the IPO. The probability of completing the issue also depends on the
current state of the IPO markets, where the number of withdrawn IPOs and the first-day return of
recent IPOs both have a negative effect on the completion rate. Controlling for the performance of
recent IPOs, the completion likelihood is further decreasing in the pre-issue stock market return,
Public, and it is more sensitive to the market return in falling than rising markets.
Turning to columns (2) and (3), most of the inferences hold across underwriters of different
quality. The exception is the coefficient for Public*PublicPOS , which is negative and significant
for lower-tier underwriters only. That is, for top-tier underwriters, the completion likelihood is
independent of the pre-issue market return when stock markets are rising.
We use the probit estimates from these first stage regressions to compute the Inverse Mill’s
ratio for each observation. The inclusion of the Inverse Mill’s ratio in the second-step regressions
helps correct for the self-selection in the truncated sample of initial returns.
4.4 Verifying Partial Adjustment to Public Information
Before examining the implications of our model, we first verify that the positive relation between
the initial return and the pre-issue market return found by others also hold in the cross-section for
our sample. Table 5 reports the coefficient estimates from OLS regressions for the initial return,
IR1. The explanatory variables in column (1) are the two main variables of interest, Public and
Private, as well as the Inverse Mill’s ratio from Table 4.
Column (2) adds firm and issue characteristics such as firm age (Age), Underwriter Rank,
Amount Filed, the percent of the offered shares newly issued by the firm (Primary), and dummy
variables indicating that the firm is in the high-tech industry (High Tech), backed by a venture
capital firm (V C) and listed on Nasdaq (Nasdaq). Column (3) further includes Spillover IR1 and
Spillover Revision, both capturing the current state of the IPO markets. Finally, columns (4) and
(5) split the sample by underwriter rank. All variables are defined in Table 3. Standard errors are
clustered by Fama-French 49 industry.
As shown in Table 5, the coefficients for Private and Public are positive and statistically
Spillover Revision+ .
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significant (p<0.001) in all regression models. The former is consistent with underwriters leaving
money on the table for investors submitting informed bids, as in Benveniste and Spindt (1989)’s
information-based equilibrium. The latter is the puzzle of partial adjustment to public information
that our model sets out to explain.
Note that the Inverse Mill’s ratio is insignificant in columns (2)-(4), when the control variables
are included. This suggests that the truncation caused by withdrawals does not bias the coefficient
estimates in the regular OLS.17 Moreover, several of the control variables are significant. The initial
return is increasing in the average initial return and price revision of recent IPOs. Also, for the
subsample of IPOs sold by top-ranked underwriters, the initial return decreases in firm age and
tends to be higher for issuers backed by a venture capitalist.
4.5 Tests of the incentive effect
Having established the positive relation between underpricing and pre-issue market return in our
sample, we next turn to tests of the incentive effect. A central prediction of our model is that,
ceteris paribus, investors require less underpricing to truthfully report their information in rising
markets than in falling markets. We test this prediction by regressing the initial return on our
proxy for private information, separated by negative and positive market returns. Specifically, we
run the following regression:
IR1 = γ + β1Public+ β2Private+ β3Private ∗ PublicPOS + e. (10)
The interaction variable Private∗PublicPOS hence captures the difference in the impact of private
information on the initial return in rising vs. falling markets. Our model predicts that β3 < 0.
Table 6 reports the coefficient estimates from OLS regressions of Eq. (10) and has a similar
structure as Table 5. Starting with the full sample (columns (1)-(3)), Public and Private again
both generate positive and highly significant (p<0.001) coefficients in all regression specifications,
consistent with partial adjustment. Turning to the interaction term Private*PublicPOS , it enters
with a significantly (p<0.05) negative coefficient in two of the three regression specifications. As
17The coefficient estimates are largely unchanged when we exclude the Inverse Mill’s ratios from the regressions.
Edelen and Kadlec (2005) also report an insignificant coefficient for the Inverse Mill’s ratio and a significantly positive
coefficient for the market return, indicating that the Heckman correction itself is insufficient to explain the partial
adjustment to public information.
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predicted by our model, the underpricing associated with a given price revision is smaller in rising
markets than in falling markets.18
As discussed above, the incentive effect requires an informative order book. To the extent that
high-quality underwriters receive more informative bids, the incentive effect should be strongest for
these underwriters. Hence, to exploit potential differences in order book informativeness, columns
(4) and (5) split the sample by underwriter rank.
Importantly, the interaction term Private*PublicPOS generates a negative and highly significant
(p<0.01) coefficient for top-tier underwriters (column (4)). It is possible that top-tier underwriters
tend to compensate investors less for their private information in positive markets than in negative
markets, as implied by the incentive effect. Moreover, the coefficient for Private is higher for IPOs
by top-tier than lower-tier underwriters (1.01 vs. 0.38, significantly different at the 1% level). It
appears that investors on average receive higher compensation for their information in issues sold
by top-tier underwriters, consistent with a more informative order book.
Note also that the coefficient for Public becomes insignificant when Private*PublicPOS is in-
cluded in column (4). That is, for the subsample of top-tier underwriters, the positive relation
between the initial return and the market return disappears after controlling for the incentive effect.
Our model is thus able to successfully explain the puzzling partial adjustment to public information
for the subsample of top-tier underwriters, where the order book is most informative.19
Column (5) of Table 6 shows the regression estimation for the subsample of lower-tier un-
derwriters. Here, the initial return increases not only with Public and Private, but also with
Private*PublicPOS—something that our model is neither designed to nor able to explain. It is,
however, consistent with Derrien (2005), who shows that both IPO prices and initial returns in-
creased with investor demand during the internet bubble.
Another prediction of our model is that the incentive effect plays out only when investor demand
is high and the issue is underpriced. To explore this dimension of the model, we re-estimate the
regression models in Table 6 and add interaction terms with PrivatePOS , indicating that the final
offer price is revised upwards. Given that PrivatePOS captures high investor demand, we expect
18Sherman (2005) proposes that investors’ opportunity cost of becoming informed increases with the market return.
Her model thus predicts β3 > 0, which is rejected by our evidence.
19Cornelli and Goldreich (2003) similarly show that the underwriter, in setting the issue price, relies on the reaction
in investor bids to public information rather than the public information itself.
19
the incentive effect to be concentrated to issues with a positive price revision.
The coefficient estimates from these regressions are presented in Table 7. Starting with the full
sample of IPOs (columns (1) to (3)), the coefficient for Private*PrivatePOS is positive and highly
significant (p<0.001), and of a much larger size than that of Private (0.85 vs. 0.14 in columns
(2) and (3)). This is consistent with investors being compensated for their private information
primarily when demand is high, as in our model. Moreover, Private*PublicPOS is insignificant,
while Private*PrivatePOS*PublicPOS is negative and highly significant (p<0.001) in column (1),
providing some evidence that the incentive effect largely plays out when demand is high.
We next turn to the subsample of top-tier underwriters (column (4)), where we expect the incen-
tive effect to be strongest. First, the coefficient for Private is insignificant, while Private*PrivatePOS
is highly significant (p<0.001), as if partial adjustment to private information exists only when de-
mand is high. Second, as in column (1), Private*PrivatePOS*PublicPOS is significantly negative
(p<0.001), while Private*PublicPOS is insignificant, suggesting that the incentive effect exists only
for high investor demand, as predicted by our model. Third, the coefficient for Public is now in-
significant. For top-tier underwriters, our incentive effect—by channeling the effect of the market
return through the offer price adjustment—captures what may have appeared like partial adjust-
ment to public information.
For lower-tier underwriters (column (5) of Table 7), however, Private is positive (p<0.05) and
Private*PrivatePOS is insignificant, so investor demand does not influence the relation between the
offer price revision and first-day return. Moreover, the coefficient for Private*PrivatePOS*PublicPOS
now takes the opposite sign and is significantly positive (p<0.05). That is, consistent with Derrien
(2005) and contrary to our incentive effect, first-day returns are more sensitive to an upward price
revision in rising markets than in falling markets. As discussed above, the lack of evidence for
our incentive effect among lower-tier underwriters may be explained by their less informative order
books.
In sum, the implications of the incentive effect in our model are borne out in the data: the
underpricing associated with an offer price revision tends to be lower when the market return is
positive than when it is negative. This is consistent with underwriters adjusting the issue price
more in response to investors’ information in falling markets than in rising markets. Empirically,
the effects are concentrated to IPOs sold by top-tier underwriters and with an upwards revision of
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the final offer price. These subsets capture investors placing informative bids and issues with high
investor demand, both necessary conditions for the information-based argument by Benveniste
and Spindt (1989) to hold. Importantly, when controlling for the incentive effect, the positive
relation between the initial return and the market return disappears in the subsample of top-tier
underwriters, effectively resolving the puzzle of partial adjustment to public information.
4.6 Tests of the demand effect
For completeness, we also perform tests of the demand effect, which predicts a positive correlation
between the likelihood that the IPO is underpriced and the market return. Table 8 reports the
coefficient estimates from probit regressions for the likelihood that the initial return is positive
(IR1POS). The regression model includes our standard control variables and standard errors are
clustered by Fama-French 49 industry. Columns (1)-(4) use the full sample of completed IPOs,
while columns (5) and (6) split the sample by underwriter rank.
Note first that, consistent with the demand effect, the likelihood that the issue is underpriced
increases with Public and, in columns (2) and (4), with the dummy variable PublicPOS (p<0.001).
Focusing on the last two columns, the coefficient for Public is greater for lower-tier underwriters
than for top-tier underwriters (5.0 vs. 3.1, p<0.001 for the difference), suggesting that the demand
effect is stronger for lower-tier underwriters.
The variable Private also produces a positive and significant coefficient (p<0.001) in all regres-
sion models. That is, the greater the investor demand, the more likely is the issue to be underpriced.
This is consistent with our model, where the offer is underpriced only in the high-demand state.
Finally, several of the control variables generate significant coefficients. In the full sample of
completed IPOs, the likelihood of a positive initial return increases with the mean initial return in
recent IPOs (Spillover IR1) and it is higher for firms listing on Nasdaq. Moreover, the effect of
the number of underwriters in the issue (Underwriter Count) varies with underwriter quality: it
increases the probability that the issue is underpriced for top-tier underwriters and decreases this
probability for lower-tier underwriters.
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5 Conclusions
The empirical observation of an incomplete adjustment of the IPO offer price to the pre-issue market
return has puzzled researchers. This paper proposes a simple mechanism that explains this positive
relation between public information and IPO initial returns. By introducing an informative public
signal to the Benveniste and Spindt (1989) information-based framework, we derive a rational
Bayesian equilibrium, in which the public signal is conditionally correlated to investors’ private
signals.
In this equilibrium, public information is related to IPO underpricing through two different
channels. The first channel—the demand effect—is via investor demand. Since the probability that
investors receive positive private signals is higher when the public signal is positive, the likelihood
of sufficient demand for the issue to be underpriced is also higher.
The second channel—the incentive effect—is through investors’ incentives to truthfully reveal
their information to the underwriter. In our model, a negative public signal increases the likelihood
that a falsely reporting investor receives an allocation in the issue. With higher expected profits
from false reporting, the minimum compensation to induce truthful revelation increases, and so
does the conditional underpricing. Moreover, when the public signal is positive, the distribution of
investors’ private signals will shift to the right, and with it the firm’s after-market value, reducing
the marginal informational value of each private signal.
We test the predictions of the model for a sample of 6,301 U.S. book-built IPOs in the period
1983 to 2012. To empirically capture the public information, we use the return on the S&P500
index during the 42 trading days leading up to the issue. As a proxy for private information, we
use the residual from a regression of the revision in the offer price from the filing range mid-point
on the pre-issue stock market return. This purges any impact of the public market return on the
price revision and attributes the remaining offer price adjustment to investors’ private information.
In cross-sectional tests that are new to the literature, we use interaction variables to test the
unique implications of the incentive effect. Most important, we show that the relation between the
initial return and the offer price revision is greater in falling markets than in rising markets. This
effect is concentrated to issues sold by top-tier investment banks, where the order book has been
shown to be informative, and when investor demand is high. The finding is consistent with the
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incentive effect in our model and provides indirect support for the incentive mechanism proposed
by Benveniste and Spindt (1989). Once we control for the incentive effect, the positive relation
between the initial return and the pre-issue market return disappears. Thus, we are the first study
to successfully and completely explain this puzzling relation for the top-tier underwriters.
We also find empirical support for the demand effect: the likelihood that the issue is underpriced
increases in the public market return. While this result is not surprising, it helps complete our
empirical examination of the model.
Our model requires an informative order book and therefore works particularly well for top-tier
underwriters. In contrast, for lower-tier underwriters, where investor bids have been shown to be
less informative, the positive association between the initial return and the market return maintains.
Moreover, for these underwriters, the effect of the offer price revision on the initial return is larger
when the pre-issue market return is positive, counter to our incentive effect. The new-found puzzle
of low-quality underwriters allowing investors to capture a greater fraction of the upside in rising
markets cannot be explained by our information-based model. Since such explanation is likely to
rely on investor optimism or some other non-information based mechanism, we leave this puzzle
for future research.
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A Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1.
It follows by Bayes’ rule that
q(gi|g) = q(gi, g)
q(g),
(11)
where
q(gi, g) = q(gi, g|G)q(G) + q(gi, g|B)q(B)
= q(gi|G)q(g|G)q(G) + q(gi|B)q(g|B)q(B) (12)
= γµα+ (1− γ)(1− µ)(1− α).
Similarly,
q(g) = q(g|G)q(G) + q(g|B)q(B) = µα+ (1− µ)(1− α) (13)
and hence
q(gi|g) = γµα+ (1− γ)(1− µ)(1− α)
µα+ (1− µ)(1− α). (14)
It is then immediate that
q(gi|b) = γ(1− µ)α+ (1− γ)µ(1− α)
(1− µ)α+ µ(1− α) (15)
and also that
q(gi|g)− q(gi|b) = α(1− α)(2µ− 1)(2γ − 1)
[µα+ (1− µ)(1− α)][(1− µ)α+ µ(1− α)] > 0 (16)
since µ > 1/2 and γ > 1/2. It can similarly be shown that q(bi|b) > q(bi|g) if µ > 1/2 and γ > 1/2.
Proof of Proposition 1.
To minimize the expected payoff Uˆ(s) from falsely bidding low, investors submitting low bids get
zero shares: z(bi, n) = 0 for n > 0. For n = 0, each investor gets 1/N shares. Uˆ is further reduced
by not underpricing the issue when n = 0, so that p(0, s) = v(0, s).
The expected payoff to an investor with a positive private signal from bidding low is now
Uˆ(s) = q(1|s) 1
N
[v(1, s)− v(0, s)], (17)
which is strictly positive since v(1, s) > v(0, s).
The expected payoff to an investor from truthfully bidding high is
U(s) =
N∑
n=1
q(n|s) 1
n
[v(n, s)− p(n, s)]. (18)
Since there are N − 1 prices to be determined from one constraint, the set of prices p(n, s); n =
1, . . . , N that satisfies the investor’s incentive constraint U(s) = Uˆ(s) is indeterminate. With no loss
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of insight, we let p(n, s) = v(n, s) for each n = 1, . . . , N − 1.20 The offer price in the high-demand
state, p(N, s), is now uniquely determined from U(s) = Uˆ(s), where
U(s) = q(N |s) 1
N
[v(N, s)− p(N, s)], (19)
which gives
p(N, s) = v(N, s)− q(1|s)
q(N |s) [v(1, s)− v(0, s)]. (20)
Since v(1, s) > v(0, s), it follows that p(N, s) < v(N, s) and the issue is underpriced for n = N .
For the proofs of propositions 2-4, we use the following probabilistic assumptions and Bayes’ rule:
V = {G = 1, B = 0}
si = {gi, bi}
s = {g, b}
q(gi | G) = q(bi | B) = γ > q(bi | G) = q(gi | B) = (1− γ) (21)
q(g | G) = q(b | B) = µ > q(b | G) = q(g | B) = (1− µ) (22)
q(G) = α q(B) = (1− α)
q(s) = q(s|G)q(G) + q(s|B)q(B)
q(G | g) = pi = µα
µα+ (1− µ)(1− α)
q(B | g) = p¯i = (1− pi)
q(B | b) = β = µ(1− α)
µ(1− α) + (1− µ)α
q(G | b) = β¯ = (1− β)
Assumptions (21) and (22) imply that the signals (si, s) are informative, and hence
q(G|g) > q(G)
µα
µα+ (1− µ)(1− α) > α
µ > µα+ (1− µ)(1− α)
(2µ− 1) > (2µ− 1)α
q(g|G) = µ > 1/2,
which holds for all α ∈ (0, 1).
Moreover, the probability of n positive private signals is given by
q(n | G) ∼ Binomial[N, γ]
q(n | B) ∼ Binomial[N, (1− γ)]
q(n | s) = q(n | G)q(G | s) + q(n | B)q(B | s).
20See Appendix B for a more general version of the model, where the issue is allocated to at least n¯ investors and
the n for which the issue is underpriced is determined endogenously.
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Finally the expected aftermarket value v(n, s) is given by
v(n, s) = G× q(G | n, s) = 1× q(n | G)
q(n | s) q(G | s).
Proof of Proposition 2.
The initial return associated with the high-demand state equals
r(N, s) =
v(N, s)
p(N, s)
− 1; s ∈ {b, g}, (23)
where
p(N, s) = v(N, s)− q(1 | s)
q(N | s) [v(1, s)− v(0, s)] . (24)
We want to show that r(N, g) < r(N, b), or that
v(N, g)
p(N, g)
<
v(N, b)
p(N, b)
, (25)
which is equivalent to
q(N | g)v(N, g)
q(N | b)v(N, b) >
q(1 | g)
q(1 | b)
[v(1, g)− v(0, g)]
[v(1, b)− v(0, b)] . (26)
This inequality may be written as
q(G | g)
q(G | b) >
q(1 | g)
q(1 | b)
[
q(1|G)
q(1|g) − q(0|G)q(0|g)
]
q(G | g)[
q(1|G)
q(1|b) − q(0|G)q(0|b)
]
q(G | b)
, (27)
which again can be expressed as
1 >
q(0 | b)
q(0 | g)
q(1 | G)q(0 | g)− q(0 | G)q(1 | g)
q(1 | G)q(0 | b)− q(0 | G)q(1 | b) . (28)
Substituting Zs =
1
N
q(1|s)
q(0|s) , the inequality in (28) simplifies to
1 >
q(1 | G)− q(0 | G)NZg
q(1 | G)− q(0 | G)NZb =
γ − (1− γ)Zg
γ − (1− γ)Zb . (29)
Inequality (29) holds if Zg > Zb, and we therefore must have that
Zg =
1
N
q(1 | g)
q(0 | g) >
1
N
q(1 | b)
q(0 | b) = Zb
q(1 | G)q(G | g) + q(1 | B)q(B | g)
q(0 | G)q(G | g) + q(0 | B)q(B | g) >
q(1 | G)q(G | b) + q(1 | B)q(B | b)
q(0 | G)q(G | b) + q(0 | B)q(B | b)
γ(1− γ)N−1pi + γN−1(1− γ)p¯i
(1− γ)Npi + γN p¯i >
γ(1− γ)N−1β¯ + γN−1(1− γ)β
(1− γ)N β¯ + γNβ (30)
Dividing by γN and substituting Γ = 1−γγ , we get
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ΓN−1pi + Γp¯i
ΓNpi + p¯i
>
ΓN−1β¯ + Γβ
ΓN β¯ + β
ΓNpi + Γ2p¯i
ΓNpi + p¯i
>
ΓN β¯ + Γ2β
ΓN β¯ + β
ΓNpi + Γ2p¯i + p¯i − p¯i
ΓNpi + p¯i
>
ΓN β¯ + Γ2β + β − β
ΓN β¯ + β
1− (1− Γ
2)p¯i
ΓNpi + p¯i
> 1− (1− Γ
2)β
ΓN β¯ + β
(1− Γ2)β
ΓN β¯ + β
>
(1− Γ2)p¯i
ΓNpi + p¯i
.
Assuming Γ < 1, which implies γ > 1/2, we have
β[ΓNpi + p¯i] > p¯i[ΓN β¯ + β]
ΓN [piβ − p¯iβ¯] > 0. (31)
As long as ΓN > 0, we have that
piβ > p¯iβ¯ = (1− pi)(1− β)
piβ > 1− pi − β + piβ
pi + β > 1 (32)
pi + β =
q(g|G)q(G)
q(g)
+
q(b|B)q(B)
q(b)
> 1
q(g|G)q(G)q(b) + q(b|B)q(B)q(g) > q(g)q(b)
q(g|G)q(G)q(b) + q(b|B)q(B)q(g) > [q(g|G)q(G) + q(g|B)q(B)]q(b)
q(b|B)q(B)q(g) > q(g|B)q(B)q(b)
q(b|B)q(g) > q(g|B)q(b)
µ[µα+ (1− µ)(1− α)] > (1− µ)[µ(1− α) + (1− µ)α]
µ2α > (1− µ)2α
µ > 1/2 (33)
Thus, for any γ, µ > 1/2, α ∈ (0, 1) and ΓN > 0 we have that r(N, g) < r(N, b).
Proof of Proposition 3.
By Bayes’ rule it follows that
q(N | g) = q(N | G)q(G | g) + q(N | B)q(B | g) (34)
= γNpi + (1− γ)N p¯i
q(N | b) = q(N | G)q(G | b) + q(N | B)q(B | b) (35)
= γN β¯ + (1− γ)Nβ
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Take the difference to prove the proposition.
q(N | g) > q(N | b)
γNpi + (1− γ)N p¯i > γN β¯ + (1− γ)Nβ
pi +
(
1− γ
γ
)N
p¯i > β¯ +
(
1− γ
γ
)N
β
(pi − β¯) + ΓN (p¯i − β) > 0
(pi + β − 1)(1− ΓN ) > 0 (36)
Using the same reasoning as from (32) to (33), it follows that q(N | g) > q(N | b) holds for any
µ > 1/2, α ∈ (0, 1) and ΓN < 1 (which holds if γ > 1/2).
Proof of Proposition 4.
The proposition is proved by showing that
lim
N→∞
Er(g)
Er(b)
= lim
N→∞
r(N, g)
r(N, b)
q(N | g)
q(N | b) > 1. (37)
Assuming that the signals are informative (γ, β > 1/2), taking the limit of (31) and (36) implies
lim
N→∞
r(N, g)
r(N, b)
= 1 (38)
lim
N→∞
q(N | g)
q(N | b) > 1, (39)
which completes the proof.
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B Appendix
In a more general version of the model, assume that the underwriter is constrained to allocate at
most a fraction m¯ < 1 of the issue to one investor. A central implication of Benveniste and Spindt
(1989) is that it is optimal to minimize (maximize) the fraction of shares allocated to investors
reporting negative (positive) information. In the current setting, this implies that investors bidding
low will be allocated shares only if n < n¯ = 1/m¯. If nm¯ ≥ 1, investors placing high bids will each
receive 1/n of the issue. If instead nm¯ < 1, investors bidding high will each receive 1/n¯ of the issue,
leaving 1− nm¯ to investors that bid low, each receiving
(
1
N−n
)(
1− nn¯
)
of the issue.
The underwriter prices the issue after collecting investors’ bids, committing to price the issue
so that it is never overpriced in expectation. In particular, for the case n ≥ n¯, the issuer sets a
price pH(s) in order to induce investors with positive signals to bid high. For the case n < n¯, the
underwriter sets a price pn(s) = v(n, s), which ensures that investors who bid low earn zero excess
returns in equilibrium.21 The pricing pH(s) for the case n ≥ nˆ may be interpreted as an upward
revision of the offer price relative to the midpoint of the initial range, and similarly the pricing for
the case n < nˆ as a downward revision.
To find pH(s), consider first the expected payoff to an investor who falsely bids low:
Uˆ(s) =
n¯−1∑
n=0
( 1
N − n
)(
1− n
n¯
)
q(n|s, gi)(v(n+ 1, s)− v(n, s)), (40)
where
q(n|gi, g) =
(
N − 1
n
)(
γn+1(1− γ)N−1−nµα+ (1− γ)n+1γN−1−n(1− µ)(1− α)
µγα+ (1− µ)(1− γ)(1− α)
)
(41)
q(n|gi, b) =
(
N − 1
n
)(
γn+1(1− γ)N−1−n(1− µ)α+ (1− γ)n+1γN−1−nµ(1− α)
(1− µ)γα+ µ(1− γ)(1− α)
)
(42)
v(n, g) =
γn(1− γ)N−nµα
γn(1− γ)N−nµα+ (1− γ)nγN−n(1− µ)(1− α) (43)
and
v(n+ 1, g) =
γn(1− γ)N−nµα
γn(1− γ)N−nµα+ (1− γ)nγN−n(1− µ)(1− α) . (44)
The expression for Uˆ(s) reflects the assumption that the underwriter sets a price that fully incor-
porates the information in investors’ bids whenever n < nˆ.
Next, we establish the offer price pH(s) that is necessary to induce investors to truthfully bid
high. The incentive constraint for such an investor is
N−1∑
n=n¯−1
1
1 + n
q(n|gi, s)(v(n+ 1, s)− pH(s)) ≥ Uˆ(s). (45)
21An alternative pricing strategy is to offer a fixed price pL(s) that, in equilibrium, gives a zero expected return
to investors with low bids. It can be shown, however, that this alternative pricing strategy will yield strictly higher
incentives to falsely bid low, and hence it will yield higher underpricing and is not optimal. Importantly, the main
results are unaffected by which of the two pricing strategies are employed.
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Solving this constraint as an equality with respect to pH(s) gives
pH(s) =
(
N−1∑
n=n¯−1
1
1 + n
q(n|gi, s)
)−1( N−1∑
n=n¯−1
1
1 + n
q(n|gi, s)v(n+ 1, s)− Uˆ
)
. (46)
The expected aftermarket value of the firm conditional on an upward revision in the offer price
(n ≥ n¯) is given by
vH(s) =
( N∑
n=n¯
q(n|s)
)−1 N∑
n=n¯
q(n|s)v(n, s). (47)
The issue is underpriced if vH(s) > pH(s), which obtains whenever Uˆ > 0.
22 The initial return
associated with an upward revision in the offer price is then
r(s) =
vH(s)
pH(s)
− 1 (48)
and the expected initial return is
Er(s) =
N∑
n=n¯
q(n|s)r(s). (49)
In other words, as in the simpler model in the paper, the expected initial return Er(s) consists
of the probability
∑N
n=n¯ q(n|s) of an upward revision in the offer price, and the initial return r(s)
conditional on this upward revision.
As before, partial adjustment to public information requires that
Er(g) > Er(b). (50)
The incentive effect and the demand effect imply, respectively, that
r(g)
r(b)
< 1 (51)
and ∑N
n=n¯ q(n|g)∑N
n=n¯ q(n|b)
> 1. (52)
It can be shown numerically that this more general version of the model behaves similarly to
the simpler model solved analytically in the paper. In particular, the incentive effect and demand
effect both hold (unequivocally), and the demand effect dominates the incentive effect whenever the
number of investors is sufficiently large, ensuring partial adjustment to public information. Finally,
the intuition as well as the empirical implications of the effects remain unaltered.
22This is seen by noting that pH(s) may be written as pH(s) = vH(s)− Uˆ(s)∑N−1
n=n¯−1
1
1+n
q(n|s) and hence pH(s) < vH(s)
if (and only if) Uˆ(s) > 0.
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Table 1: Sample Initial IPO Return and Pre-issue Market Return
The table shows the average initial return and pre-issue market return by year for the sample of 6,301 U.S. IPOs
filed in the period 1983 to 2012. The initial return is IR1 = p1/p0 − 1, where p1 is the closing price on the first
trading day and p0 is the offer price, winsorized at 200%. Public is the return on the S&P500 index (S&P500) over
the 42 trading days leading up to the issue. N is the number of observations.
Sample of all IPOs Sample of completed IPOs Sample of withdrawn IPOs
IR1 Public % of Public
Year N N Mean Mean % Positive N sample Mean % Positive
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
1983 244 243 10.4 1.6 60.5 1 0.4 −3.2 0.0
1984 111 105 6.9 0.8 57.1 6 5.4 0.7 50.0
1985 110 102 5.7 4.0 82.4 8 7.3 5.4 87.5
1986 276 236 14.3 2.8 72.5 40 14.5 1.1 60.0
1987 187 165 12.9 6.1 86.1 22 11.8 2.8 90.9
1988 64 59 5.3 1.1 61.0 5 7.8 0.1 40.0
1989 80 66 7.7 3.2 69.7 14 17.5 3.6 78.6
1990 100 77 10.2 −0.2 55.8 23 23.0 2.2 73.9
1991 240 224 11.9 1.5 60.7 16 6.7 2.2 50.0
1992 354 304 10.5 2.0 65.8 50 14.1 0.9 66.0
1993 441 393 12.8 1.3 76.3 48 10.9 1.0 77.1
1994 369 317 8.9 −0.5 44.2 52 14.1 −0.1 50.0
1995 391 344 21.4 4.9 100.0 47 12.0 4.8 97.9
1996 585 536 16.9 3.9 85.6 49 8.4 4.4 83.7
1997 420 351 15.1 5.1 86.0 69 16.4 5.8 84.1
1998 292 214 25.5 4.9 79.9 78 26.7 1.3 52.6
1999 439 377 66.9 2.6 72.4 62 14.1 2.9 72.6
2000 392 311 52.9 0.1 49.5 81 20.7 −1.8 40.7
2001 135 58 16.3 0.2 48.3 77 57.0 −7.2 15.6
2002 63 49 10.9 −3.7 24.5 14 22.2 −4.5 21.4
2003 55 47 12.3 3.4 100.0 8 14.5 3.5 87.5
2004 143 129 12.5 2.3 68.2 14 9.8 −0.5 21.4
2005 154 134 12.1 1.5 67.9 20 13.0 1.7 80.0
2006 148 124 13.6 2.6 80.6 24 16.2 2.1 70.8
2007 156 132 14.9 1.6 67.4 24 15.4 1.2 54.2
2008 41 17 6.4 −3.2 29.4 24 58.5 −3.2 33.3
2009 43 35 11.3 5.0 97.1 8 18.6 6.5 75.0
2010 90 78 9.4 3.4 71.8 12 13.3 −1.2 41.7
2011 84 69 14.8 1.7 65.2 15 17.9 −0.4 33.3
2012 94 73 16.0 3.9 86.3 21 22.3 0.9 61.9
Total 6 301 5 369 19.7% 2.5% 72.0% 932 14.8% 0.9% 60.1%
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Table 3: Variable Definitions
The table shows names and definitions of, and sources for, the variables used in the analysis. Ken French and Jay
Ritter refer to their respective data webpages. p0 is the final offer price, and pL and pH are the lower and upper
bound, respectively, of the initial filing range.
Name Definition Sources
A: Variables critical for testing the model
Revision Revision of the final offer price from the initial filing range midpoint (pmid),
defined as Revision = p0/pmid − 1.
SDC
IR1 Initial return IR1 = p1/p0 − 1, where p1 is the firm’s closing price on the
first trading day, and winsorized at 200%. Proxy for underpricing.
SDC, CRSP
Public Return on the S&P500 index over the 42 trading days preceding the issue.
Proxy for public information during the book building period.
CRSP
Private The residual from the regression Revision = α+ β ∗ Public+ , set to zero
when || < 1%. Proxy for private information.
SDC, CRSP
POS, NEG The subscripts POS and NEG indicate a dummy taking the value of one if
the variable is positive and non-positive, respectively.
Top-tier Dummy indicating that at least one of the underwriters has a Carter and
Manaster (1990) rank of 9.
SDC
Lower-tiers Dummy indicating that all of the underwriters has a Carter and Manaster
(1990) rank below 9.
SDC
B: Control variables
Age Log of firm age since the founding year. Jay Ritter
Primary Percentage of shares sold in IPO as primary share (new issue). SDC
Amount Filed Log of total $ amount filed in the IPO. SDC
Spillover Revision Price revision spillover. The average Revision, orthogonalized to Public,
for all IPOs in the 42 trading days prior to listing.
SDC, CRSP
Spillover IR1 Initial return spillover. The average IR1, orthogonalized to Spillover Revi-
sion and Public, for all IPOs in the 42 trading days prior to listing.
SDC, CRSP
Spillover Withdrawn The number of withdrawn IPOs in the 42 trading days prior to listing. SDC
Underwriter Count Log of the number of underwriters in the IPO. SDC
High Tech Indicator that the IPO firm is a high-technology firm. SDC
VC Indicator that the IPO firm is backed by a venture capital firm. SDC
Nasdaq Indicator that the IPO firm is listed on Nasdaq. CRSP
C: Clustering Variables
FF49id Fama-French 49 industry indices definitions. Ken French
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Table 4: Probability of Completing the IPO
The table reports the coefficient estimates from a probit regression for the probability that a filed IPO is completed
vs. withdrawn prior to the issue. Column (1) uses the full sample, while columns (2) and (3) split the sample by
underwriter rank: Top-tier and Lower-tiers indicate that the highest-ranked underwriter has a Carter and Manaster
(1990) rank=9 and rank<9, respectively. All variables are defined in Table 3. The z-scores (in parenthesis) use
standard errors clustered by Fama-French 49 industry. *, **, *** and **** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, 1%,
and 0.1% level, respectively. The sample consists of 6,301 book-built U.S. IPOs filed in the period 1983 to 2012.
Sample of all IPOs Top-tier Lower-tiers
(1) (2) (3)
Public ∗ PublicPOS −2.141∗∗∗ −0.320 −3.466∗∗∗∗
(−2.97) (−0.36) (−3.39)
Public ∗ PublicNEG 10.244∗∗∗∗ 8.534∗∗∗∗ 11.900∗∗∗∗
(11.80) (7.38) (8.77)
Underwriter Count 1.007∗∗∗∗ 1.244∗∗∗∗ 0.680∗∗∗∗
(16.20) (12.89) (10.11)
Amount Filed −0.503∗∗∗∗ −0.475∗∗∗∗ −0.535∗∗∗∗
(−15.20) (−10.23) (−9.22)
Underwriter Rank 0.067∗∗∗∗ 0.106∗∗∗∗
(4.83) (8.29)
Spillover IR1 −1.721∗∗∗∗ −1.679∗∗∗∗ −1.824∗∗∗∗
(−14.98) (−7.35) (−7.37)
Spillover PU −0.279 −0.344 −0.148
(−0.72) (−0.66) (−0.28)
Spillover WD −0.054∗∗∗∗ −0.057∗∗∗∗ −0.051∗∗∗∗
(−10.27) (−6.82) (−7.72)
Constant 8.913∗∗∗∗ 8.641∗∗∗∗ 9.428∗∗∗∗
(15.40) (10.31) (10.05)
Observations 6,301 3,071 3,230
of which completed 5,369 2,707 2,662
of which withdrawn 932 364 568
Pseudo R2 0.225 0.288 0.191
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Table 5: Tests for Partial Adjustment to Public Information
The table reports the coefficient estimates from OLS regressions for the initial return (IR1). Public is the return
on the S&P500 index over the 42 trading days leading up to the issue. Private is the residual from the regression
Revision = α + beta ∗ Public + , where the dependent variable is the revision in the final offer price from the
filing range midpoint. The Inverse Mill’s ratio is from the probit regressions in table 4. All variables are defined
in Table 3. The t-statistics (in parenthesis) use standard errors clustered by Fama-French 49 industry. *, **,
*** and **** denotes significance at the 10%, 5%, 1%, and 0.1% level, respectively. The sample consist of 6,301
book-built U.S. IPOs between 1983-2012.
Sample of all completed IPOs Top-tier Lower-tiers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Public 0.385∗∗∗∗ 0.419∗∗∗∗ 0.422∗∗∗∗ 0.268∗∗ 0.675∗∗∗∗
(4.53) (4.85) (5.11) (2.31) (5.65)
Private 0.864∗∗∗∗ 0.806∗∗∗∗ 0.695∗∗∗∗ 0.870∗∗∗∗ 0.505∗∗∗∗
(9.30) (11.88) (14.57) (15.51) (13.71)
Age −0.034∗∗∗∗ −0.020∗∗∗∗ −0.027∗∗∗∗ −0.007
(−3.75) (−4.48) (−5.17) (−1.27)
High Tech 0.066∗∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗ 0.030∗ 0.009
(4.57) (2.07) (1.69) (0.81)
Underwriter Rank 0.013∗∗∗ 0.001 0.003
(3.06) (0.39) (1.01)
Primary 0.002 0.009 0.023 −0.045
(0.07) (0.41) (1.04) (−0.71)
Amount Filed 0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001
(0.46) (−0.58) (−0.24) (−0.56)
VC 0.040∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗∗ 0.061∗∗∗ −0.002
(3.17) (2.82) (3.32) (−0.21)
NASDAQ 0.034∗∗∗ 0.021∗ 0.025∗ −0.009
(3.52) (1.96) (1.87) (−0.57)
Spillover IR1 0.794∗∗∗∗ 0.778∗∗∗∗ 0.621∗∗∗∗
(9.39) (9.48) (5.09)
Spillover PU 0.624∗∗∗∗ 0.569∗∗∗∗ 0.613∗∗∗∗
(7.06) (5.65) (4.17)
Inverse Mill’s Ratio −0.056∗∗ 0.007 −0.012 −0.049 0.086∗∗∗
(−2.67) (0.36) (−0.56) (−1.45) (2.78)
Constant 0.199∗∗∗∗ 0.061 0.198∗∗∗∗ 0.189∗∗∗∗ 0.210∗∗
(8.63) (1.06) (5.28) (3.99) (2.61)
Observations 5369 5369 5369 2707 2662
Adjusted R2 0.182 0.216 0.330 0.386 0.204
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Table 6: Tests for the Incentive Effect
The table reports the coefficient estimates from OLS regressions for the initial return (IR1). Public
is the return on the S&P500 index over the 42 trading days leading up to the issue. PublicPOS is a
dummy variable taking the value of one if Public > 0. Private is the residual from the regression
Revision = α+ beta ∗Public+ , where the dependent variable is the revision in the final offer price
from the filing range midpoint. The Inverse Mill’s ratio is from the probit regressions reported in
table 4. All variables are defined in Table 3. The t-statistics (in parenthesis) use standard errors
clustered by Fama-French 49 industry. *, **, *** and **** denotes significance at the 10%, 5%, 1%,
and 0.1% level, respectively. The sample consist of 6,301 book-built U.S. IPOs between 1983-2012.
Sample of all completed IPOs Top-tier Lower-tiers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Public 0.613∗∗∗∗ 0.576∗∗∗∗ 0.417∗∗∗ 0.211 0.709∗∗∗
(3.79) (3.88) (3.08) (1.11) (3.30)
Private 0.981∗∗∗∗ 0.934∗∗∗∗ 0.704∗∗∗∗ 1.006∗∗∗∗ 0.376∗∗∗∗
(6.82) (8.24) (11.90) (11.68) (8.57)
Private ∗ PublicPOS −0.152∗∗ −0.168∗∗ −0.012 −0.178∗∗∗ 0.168∗∗∗∗
(−2.09) (−2.42) (−0.41) (−2.89) (3.71)
PublicPOS −0.033∗∗ −0.023∗ 0.001 0.012 0.001
(−2.07) (−1.80) (0.06) (0.60) (0.04)
Age −0.034∗∗∗∗ −0.020∗∗∗∗ −0.027∗∗∗∗ −0.006
(−3.73) (−4.45) (−5.11) (−1.20)
High Tech 0.066∗∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗ 0.031∗ 0.007
(4.60) (2.07) (1.70) (0.69)
Underwriter Rank 0.013∗∗∗ 0.001 0.003
(3.12) (0.39) (0.97)
Primary 0.002 0.009 0.025 −0.044
(0.07) (0.41) (1.13) (−0.70)
Amount Filed 0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001
(0.48) (−0.59) (−0.23) (−0.47)
VC 0.040∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗∗ 0.062∗∗∗ −0.002
(3.20) (2.83) (3.38) (−0.21)
NASDAQ 0.034∗∗∗ 0.021∗ 0.025∗ −0.007
(3.51) (1.97) (1.90) (−0.45)
Spillover IR1 0.793∗∗∗∗ 0.773∗∗∗∗ 0.629∗∗∗∗
(9.39) (9.47) (5.02)
Spillover PU 0.623∗∗∗∗ 0.554∗∗∗∗ 0.619∗∗∗∗
(7.11) (5.56) (4.17)
Inverse Mill’s Ratio −0.059∗∗∗ 0.004 −0.011 −0.049 0.085∗∗∗
(−2.74) (0.21) (−0.57) (−1.45) (2.74)
Constant 0.218∗∗∗∗ 0.076 0.198∗∗∗∗ 0.179∗∗∗ 0.203∗∗
(8.09) (1.31) (4.70) (3.46) (2.53)
Observations 5369 5369 5369 2707 2662
Adjusted R2 0.184 0.218 0.330 0.386 0.205
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Table 7: Tests for the Incentive Effect when Private Information is Positive
The table reports the coefficient estimates from OLS regressions for the initial return (IR1). Public is the return
on the S&P500 index over the 42 trading days leading up to the issue. PublicPOS is a dummy variable taking
the value of one if Public > 0. Private is the residual from the regression Revision = α + beta ∗ Public + ,
where the dependent variable is the revision in the final offer price from the filing range midpoint. Top-tier and
Lower-tiers indicate that the highest-ranked underwriter has a Carter and Manaster (1990) rank=9 and rank<9,
respectively. The Inverse Mill’s ratio is from the probit regressions in Table 4. Other Controls are the control
variables from column (3) of Table 5. All variables are defined in Table 3. The t-statistics (in parenthesis) use
standard errors clustered by Fama-French 49 industry. *, **, *** and **** denotes significance at the 10%, 5%,
1%, and 0.1% level, respectively. The sample consist of 6,301 book-built U.S. IPOs between 1983-2012.
Sample of all completed IPOs Top-tier Lower-tiers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Public 0.559∗∗∗ 0.385∗∗ 0.385∗∗ 0.175 0.678∗∗∗
(3.22) (2.62) (2.62) (0.89) (3.10)
Private 0.114 0.144∗∗ 0.144∗∗ −0.021 0.255∗∗
(1.62) (2.08) (2.08) (−0.22) (2.23)
Private ∗ PublicPOS 0.026 −0.005 −0.005 0.132 −0.104
(0.33) (−0.06) (−0.06) (1.53) (−0.84)
Private ∗ PrivatePOS 1.394∗∗∗∗ 0.846∗∗∗∗ 0.846∗∗∗∗ 1.344∗∗∗∗ 0.241
(11.41) (6.79) (6.79) (8.75) (1.29)
Private ∗ PrivatePOS ∗ PublicPOS −0.470∗∗∗∗ −0.115 −0.115 −0.551∗∗∗∗ 0.428∗∗
(−3.66) (−1.03) (−1.03) (−3.59) (2.21)
PublicPOS −0.012 −0.004 −0.004 0.038 −0.040
(−0.68) (−0.21) (−0.21) (1.33) (−1.58)
PrivatePOS 0.072
∗ 0.062∗ 0.062∗ 0.121∗∗∗ 0.010
(1.82) (1.71) (1.71) (2.79) (0.31)
PrivatePOS ∗ PublicPOS 0.023 0.021 0.021 0.015 0.025
(1.01) (0.88) (0.88) (0.42) (0.71)
Other controls no yes yes yes yes
Inverse Mill’s Ratio −0.060∗∗∗ −0.018 −0.018 −0.061∗ 0.079∗∗
(−2.91) (−1.03) (−1.03) (−1.94) (2.49)
Constant 0.090∗∗∗∗ 0.124∗∗∗ 0.124∗∗∗ 0.025 0.208∗∗∗
(5.49) (2.90) (2.90) (0.56) (2.70)
Observations 5369 5369 5369 2707 2662
Adjusted R2 0.215 0.347 0.347 0.407 0.220
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Table 8: Tests for the Demand Effect
The table reports the coefficient estimates from probit regressions for the likelihood that the initial return is
positive (IR1POS). Public is the return on the S&P500 index over the 42 trading days leading up to the issue.
Private is the residual from the regression Revision = α + beta ∗ Public + , where the dependent variable is
the revision in the final offer price from the filing range midpoint. Columns (1) through (4) use the full sample,
while columns (5) and (6) split the sample by underwriter rank: Top-tier and Lower-tiers indicate that the
highest-ranked underwriter has a Carter and Manaster (1990) rank=9 and rank<9, respectively. All variables are
defined in Table 3. The z-scores (in parenthesis) use standard errors clustered by Fama-French 49 industry. *, **,
*** and **** denotes significance at the 10%, 5%, 1%, and 0.1% level, respectively. The sample consist of 5,369
book-built U.S. IPOs between 1983-2012.
Sample of all completed IPOs Top-tier Lower-tier
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Public 3.853∗∗∗∗ 3.885∗∗∗∗ 3.129∗∗∗∗ 4.948∗∗∗∗
(7.77) (7.99) (3.78) (8.95)
PublicPOS 0.267
∗∗∗∗ 0.278∗∗∗∗
(4.52) (4.87)
Private 3.104∗∗∗∗ 3.060∗∗∗∗ 3.140∗∗∗∗ 3.104∗∗∗∗ 3.616∗∗∗∗ 2.718∗∗∗∗
(22.65) (22.65) (24.02) (23.69) (19.43) (13.34)
Age 0.000 −0.002 −0.008 0.011
(0.02) (−0.10) (−0.28) (0.37)
Underwriter Count 0.013 0.020 0.100∗∗ −0.091∗∗
(0.52) (0.81) (2.42) (−2.49)
Spillover IR1 0.513∗∗∗ 0.523∗∗∗ 0.218 0.877∗∗
(2.80) (3.07) (0.98) (2.51)
Spillover PU −0.414∗ −0.502∗∗ −0.508∗ −0.103
(−1.75) (−2.21) (−1.67) (−0.23)
High Tech 0.030 0.033 0.060 −0.001
(0.53) (0.58) (0.81) (−0.01)
Primary −0.056 −0.043 −0.015 −0.169
(−0.47) (−0.37) (−0.11) (−0.82)
Amount Filed −0.025∗ −0.025∗ −0.027∗ −0.001
(−1.94) (−1.93) (−1.78) (−0.03)
VC 0.043 0.038 0.087 0.028
(0.93) (0.83) (1.55) (0.36)
NASDAQ 0.095∗∗ 0.098∗∗ 0.029 0.166∗∗∗
(2.20) (2.24) (0.48) (2.74)
Constant 0.709∗∗∗∗ 0.606∗∗∗∗ 1.073∗∗∗∗ 0.942∗∗∗∗ 0.965∗∗∗ 0.774∗∗
(19.17) (12.89) (4.12) (3.57) (2.73) (2.52)
Observations 5369 5369 5369 5369 2707 2662
Pseudo R2 0.123 0.117 0.129 0.124 0.165 0.104
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